NPT/CONF.2000/SR.8

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

23 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 8th meeting
Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 27 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. **Mra** (Vice-President) ..... (Myanmar)
later: Mr. **Baali** (President) ..... (Algeria)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

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Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.

00-40698 (E)

In the absence of Mr. Baali (Algeria), Mr. Mra (Myanmar), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

Mr. Nhleko (Swaziland) said that, since its entry into force, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had made steady progress towards universality and a significant number of nuclear-weapon States had dismantled their nuclear stockpiles, while others had entered into bilateral arrangements to promote transparency and cooperation. He hoped that those States that had not yet done so would accede to the Treaty without delay. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was also a high priority for the international community. The strength of that Treaty lay in its ability to create a moral and political norm against the testing of nuclear arsenals and to promote compliance with its verification regime. Swaziland had already set in motion the internal process for ratifying the Treaty.

2. His delegation looked forward to the resumption and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a binding universal legal instrument banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Those negotiations would reflect the international community's resolve to ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons under strict and effective international controls. An enhanced role for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was at the core of a strengthened non-proliferation regime. The adoption in May 1997 of a Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements had ushered in a new era in the history of non-proliferation verification and would have a positive impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards regime. His delegation welcomed the progress that had been made towards the conclusion of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and reiterated the call made in the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" for cooperation to ensure the early establishment by regional parties of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

3. **Mr. Tadmoury** (Lebanon) said that, although the world was now closer to a system for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty was still not universal, because four States in regions threatened by political tension and the spectre of armed conflicts had not acceded to it. An overview of achievements during the past five years gave grounds for hope of coming closer to the aims of the Treaty, although the Treaty lacked a mechanism to monitor the implementation of its provisions. Among the positive factors, he noted the cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation in the reduction of nuclear weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which, he hoped, would be fully implemented. In addition, a more propitious climate had been created for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

4. In that connection, he drew attention to the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice affirming the obligation to pursue and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Under the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States should be provided with effective safeguards formulated within a treaty framework designed to preserve international peace and security and to ensure the necessary protection against any nuclear accident. Regrettably, there had been no response to the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions concerning such safeguards.

5. On the other hand, there was scope within the framework of the Treaty for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in the developing countries, where resources were being depleted by demographic growth and increasing impoverishment and disease. Such peaceful uses were vital in many fields, primarily medicine and the transfer of technology, and in that regard, he emphasized the capacities of IAEA and the possible creation of subsidiary bodies under its auspices for the purpose of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear power in the service of economic, social and human development, with full IAEA monitoring and under a careful system of environmental protection.

6. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had adopted the "Resolution on the Middle East", which the United States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation had all supported. At the time, the Arab States and the non-aligned States had linked their agreement to the indefinite extension of the Treaty to the adoption of the Resolution, and it was a cause of concern that Israel still refused to accede to the Treaty and to place its nuclear installations under IAEA

Conference could not reach fruition unless Israel espoused the principle of transparency by acceding to the Treaty and placing its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards, so as to give credibility to the Treaty and remove the direct threat to security and stability at the regional and international levels. Israel's compliance with the "Resolution on the Middle East" would constitute a step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as urged by the General Assembly for many years.

7. The fact that one State in the Middle East was not a party to the Treaty constituted a precedent liable to create an atmosphere for nuclear competition marked by tension and lack of confidence. His delegation called upon the States parties to the Treaty, especially those States that had adopted the "Resolution on the Middle East", to exert their utmost efforts to ensure Israel's accession to the Treaty and persuade it to place its nuclear installations under the safeguards system, inasmuch as that was in the true interest of all States in the Middle East without exception.

8. The statements made at the current Conference had dealt seriously with the aims of the review, but the phase of assessment should lead to the phase of adopting creative decisions promoting the universality of the Treaty and making it an effective instrument for comprehensive nuclear disarmament. In view of the meagre results achieved by the multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, new policies should perhaps be envisaged that would put an end to the current frustrations and create a fresh stimulus. In that connection, he welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal in his report on the Millennium Assembly calling for an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear weapons and their dangers. Such a conference would undoubtedly initiate a promising new phase that took into account the peace, security and prosperity of future generations and their right to a better future.

9. **Mr. Vohidov** (Uzbekistan) said that his Government's foreign policy was based on the principle of non-nuclear development. The initiative of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and his own country to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia enjoyed broad political support in the region and had been reflected in the documents of the past three sessions of the General Assembly and included in the final documents of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference. The International Conference on Central Asia as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, held at Tashkent in 1997, had demonstrated the unanimity of the aspirations of the Central Asian States to ensure a safe and stable world and had set in motion the regional process aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

10. In order to establish that zone, Uzbekistan regularly conducted consultations with its neighbours and the five nuclear-weapon States. Over the past four years, with the assistance of the United Nations, IAEA and independent experts, the expert group on the formulation of a treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia had conducted several working meetings. The countries concerned were now very close to finalizing and signing the treaty. Uzbekistan was convinced that Central Asia could become the fifth nuclear-weapon-free zone. He, therefore, appealed to the Conference for support and believed that the draft Central Asian treaty should be endorsed in the final document of the Conference.

11. The situation in the world demonstrated the need to undertake the most stringent measures to strengthen the global system of strategic stability and the entire disarmament process. The trends which had emerged had had an adverse effect on the durability of the non-proliferation regime. It was obvious that nuclear weapons would remain one of the major elements of global policy for a long time. The entry into force of the START II Treaty emphasized the possibilities of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The establishment and strengthening of a nuclear non-proliferation regime was the only way of securing a ban on all nuclear tests.

12. Uzbekistan was a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and had signed an Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. In that context, the accession of Bangladesh to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the decision to ratify that Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation, were encouraging signs. It was to be hoped that the United States of America would soon follow suit. His Government supported the Secretary-General's proposal to convene an international conference to consider ways of eliminating the nuclear threat and also his assessments of the current state of the non-proliferation regime contained in the report entitled

"We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the 21st century" (A/54/2000). Lastly, Uzbekistan believed that the final document of the Conference should define in a more precise manner the role of the Treaty in promoting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security and that concrete measures to encourage the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be identified.

13. **Mr. Takev** (Bulgaria) said that the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had created the necessary conditions for putting an end to the dangerous nuclear arms race and that the current Conference would make a valuable contribution to the improvement of existing mechanisms to control and reduce nuclear arsenals. Implementation of the Treaty and other nuclear non-proliferation regimes had demonstrated the need for an effective control system over the whole spectrum of activities related to nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and the components and materials for their production. States that were not yet parties to the Treaty should therefore accede to it without delay in order to strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of the principles and goals laid down in the Treaty, which was a stabilizing factor in international relations.

14. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had a crucial role to play in improving the current nuclear non-proliferation regime and promoting nuclear disarmament. Bulgaria hoped that the Treaty would be ratified by a sufficient number of States to permit its early entry into force and, in that connection, welcomed the recent decision to ratify the Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Bulgaria also agreed on the need for effective international arrangements to provide assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in conformity with the spirit of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

15. The promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was one of the prime objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Bulgaria's nuclear facilities operated under full-scope IAEA safeguards, and the country cooperated closely with the Agency and with the European Union on nuclear safety and nuclear non-proliferation issues. His Government would shortly take up consideration of an Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with a view to its ratification He regretted the Conference on Disarmament's lack of progress towards the adoption of its programme of work. The proposal for the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of ad hoc working groups on nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space deserved special consideration and might constitute a possible basis for compromise.

16. Negotiations on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices would also be an important step towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Those negotiations should commence at an early date in the Conference on Disarmament. Adequate export control measures were an important part of international cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and an essential tool for achieving nuclear non-proliferation. Bulgaria adhered strictly to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group guidelines in its export control policy on dual-use goods and technologies. Its efforts were aimed at further improving its national export control system and bringing it into line with the relevant regulatory mechanisms of the European Union so that the competent Bulgarian authorities could successfully combat illegal trafficking in nuclear materials.

17. **Mr. Andjaba** (Namibia) expressed his delegation's support for the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Namibia welcomed the recent decisions of the Russian State Duma to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and START II and the announcement that the United States of America and the Russian Federation would resume negotiations on START III. Despite those and other positive developments, it was a matter of concern that nuclear arsenals remained at levels far in excess of any reasonable military requirement and that nuclear weapons continued to be developed. There was even some question as to whether the reduction taking place amounted merely to the replacement of obsolete weapons with newer ones.

18. The delay in the entry into force of START II and its Protocol and the recent failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty were equally regrettable. Overall, the non-nuclear-weapon States had faithfully fulfilled their obligations under article II but the nuclear-weapon States had failed to honour their commitments undertaken at the 1995 Conference. Nor had there been any serious effort to draw the four States non-parties into the Non-

Proliferation Treaty regime. Claims that nuclear weapons were needed indefinitely for national security or deterrence not only encouraged other States to acquire them but were also contrary to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament (General Assembly resolution 53/77 W, para. 1).

19. Namibia was committed to the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it had signed in 1990 soon after gaining independence. It had signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and one of the seismological stations under the International Monitoring System would be based in Namibia. His country had concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and was currently negotiating an Additional Protocol. Namibia was grateful to IAEA for its assistance in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the fields of human health, animal health, agriculture and water resources management and hoped that that assistance would continue.

20. The steps that should be taken in order to attain the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty included accelerating nuclear disarmament negotiations, promoting universal accession to the Treaty, ratification of the CTBT, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, imposing a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, adherence by States parties to all obligations under the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and establishing a nuclear weapons register to promote transparency and accountability.

21. **Mr. Daka** (Zambia) said that the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil the commitments entered into at the 1995 Conference represented a betrayal of confidence and undermined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which played a crucial role in non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The 2000 Review Conference should therefore address the issue of the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitment to fully implement the package that had been endorsed by the 1995 Conference. The current Conference should set an agenda for non-proliferation in the new millennium, including practical steps for the systematic and progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons and recommendations for the implementation of the "Resolution on the Middle East".

22. Zambia was concerned at the continuing restrictions on exports to developing countries of materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. The concerns expressed by nuclear-weapon States about perceived nuclear proliferation should not be used to justify any restrictions on exports to non-nuclear-weapon States of material, equipment and technologies to facilitate the exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Those concerns should be addressed in the appropriate multilateral forums. Moreover, in order to be effective, all non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States. His Government was therefore troubled by the attempts of some parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes. Lastly, in order to further strengthen the existing Safeguards Agreement, the Conference should reaffirm the legitimate vote of the Conference on Disarmament to pursue nuclear disarmament on the basis of the Model Additional Protocol.

23. **Mr. Mwakawago** (United Republic of Tanzania) said that his delegation supported the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. His delegation viewed the current Conference as an opportunity to redress inequities in the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and the failure of nuclear-weapon States to honour their Treaty obligations. It reaffirmed its strong support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, such as the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok. Tanzania had demonstrated its commitment by its early ratification of the Treaty of Pelindaba. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) played a crucial role in enhancing nuclear safety and should accord the highest priority to achieving full integration of its safeguards system.

24. His delegation reaffirmed its support for the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East", calling for its full implementation, and urged Israel to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to transform the region into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. He welcomed the progress achieved by the United States and the Russian Federation towards nuclear arms reduction, particularly the ratification of START II by the Russian Federation, and urged the two countries to initiate START III negotiations. His Government also commended the

unilateral limited disarmament measures taken by France and the United Kingdom. Noting the risks and the gravity of the situation resulting from the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, he said that it was not too late for the two countries to renounce the use of nuclear weapons and return to their pre-May 1998 situation.

25. His delegation, too, was concerned at the possible deployment of a national missile defence system by the United States, in gross violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That Treaty must remain a cornerstone of strategic arms reduction; its violation could trigger a new round in the nuclear arms race. The nuclear-weapon States should focus on consolidating existing disarmament and arms control treaties. Their insistence on maintaining nuclear deterrence, while arguing that the chances of a nuclear war were slim, was terrifying.

26. As long as nuclear weapons existed, there was the ever-present danger of a nuclear war, triggered either by accident or through faulty judgement. The call by non-nuclear-weapon States for negative security assurances was a legitimate concern that had long been ignored by the nuclear-weapon States. It was morally incumbent on the latter to make credible and effective efforts in that regard. The resistance of the nuclear-weapon States, with the exception of China, to renouncing the no-first-use option also gave cause for grave concern. Those States must urgently commit themselves to a no-first-use policy, coupled with a de-alerting of their nuclear arsenals in all their forms.

27. **Mr. Salamanca** (Bolivia) expressed his country's full support for the statements made by the representative of Peru on behalf of the Andean Community and the representative of Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. It was deeply concerned by the nuclear tests carried out in India and Pakistan; the slow pace of arms limitation negotiations; the continuing non-accession of four States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, three of which possessed nuclear weapons; the undermining of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the United States missile defence system; and the United States Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Non-Proliferation Treaty represented the hopes of countries like Bolivia that resources once used to produce nuclear weapons would be rechannelled into development. The underlying key ideas that had led to the drafting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty thirty years earlier should remain central to the deliberations of the current Conference on its implementation.

28. His delegation welcomed the decision by the State Duma of the Russian Federation to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and START II. It was concerned, however, at the recent statement by the Russian Prime Minister according priority to strengthening the country's military potential. In conclusion, his delegation urged the four countries whose accession would ensure the universality of the Treaty to become parties to it and agreed wholeheartedly with the representative of Brazil that a single nuclear weapon was one too many.

29. **Mr. Osei** (Ghana) said that his delegation supported the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. As a non-nuclear-weapon State and a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Ghana reaffirmed its commitment to it and other disarmament processes. However, it shared the disappointment and pessimism of many non-nuclear-weapon States about the lack of progress, largely because of the unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the necessary flexibility and political will to move forward. The nuclear-weapon States could not expect the non-nuclear-weapon States to remain committed indefinitely to the NPT and other disarmament treaties when they themselves evinced different attitudes. Yet, for the sake of mankind, everyone must remain hopeful. His delegation believed that the pursuit of a new, rather than a renewed, agenda, engendered such hope, and therefore wholeheartedly supported the New Agenda Coalition.

30. It should be recalled that the negotiations for the Treaty involved a bargain between the five nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States; since the developing countries had kept their part of the bargain, they had a right to access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to facilitate socio-economic development. His delegation welcomed the responsiveness of IAEA to the most pressing global challenges — poverty and disease, natural resources management and environmental degradation — through applied nuclear science and technology, working in partnership with other development agencies. In Ghana, primary health care was being enhanced through a project funded by IAEA. His delegation believed that the Conference should identify opportunities for the Agency's continued work at the

multilateral, regional and bilateral levels to provide financial and institutional support for the application of nuclear technology to benefit human and economic development. The technical cooperation efforts of IAEA would need to be fully complemented by the provision of adequate budgetary resources.

31. The demonstration of commitment, political will and flexibility at the Conference by the nuclear-weapon States would be critical to establishing the necessary trust and goodwill among States parties, thus promoting transparency and unrestricted exchange of nuclear materials, as well as scientific information to facilitate the development of programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Everyone had a stake in the outcome of the review process. Flexibility on the part of the key nuclear actors would boost the disarmament process. The choice was to focus on the wider goal of promoting the survival of mankind, or to remain fixed in a narrow, parochial and short-sighted vision of national goals and be doomed.

32. **Mr. Alvim** (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)) recalled that, in July 1991, the Governments of Argentina and Brazil had signed an agreement at Guadalajara, Mexico, on the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That agreement had been the outcome of a lengthy process of building trust and easing possible tension that had culminated in the establishment of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR). In signing the Guadalajaran Agreement, Argentina and Brazil had sought to ensure conditions for the application of full-scope international safeguards in the two countries. At the same time, Argentina, Brazil and Chile had proposed modifications to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and had started negotiations on a full-scope Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, with ABACC as one of the parties, which was known as the Quadripartite Agreement.

33. The Guadalajara Agreement was more stringent than the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which Argentina and Brazil had subsequently acceded. Therefore, no transition stage had been needed for the application of safeguards when the NPT had come into effect in the two countries. The new international situation at the end of the century highlighted the need to strengthen not only traditional safeguards but also the regional approach. Regional nuclear safeguards organizations had the advantage of proximity to and familiarity with the countries in question, and, representing the unwavering political will of the member countries, promoted non-proliferation in their regions and were committed to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.

34. Regional safeguards also made sense from the technical and economic standpoint, when integrated with IAEA safeguards. The integration of safeguards efforts was therefore of the utmost importance, especially for the application of the Additional Protocol, in respect of which Brazil, Argentina and ABACC had stated their intention of starting negotiations. ABACC was fully empowered to play a leading role in the application of the new safeguards. Technical cooperation between Argentina and Brazil was a way of establishing trust between them, and with the international community. Argentina, Brazil and ABACC had increased cooperation in the safeguards area, and in other fields, while ensuring the transparency required for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

35. Over nearly eight years, ABACC had carried out 944 inspections; during those inspections and joint inspections with IAEA, it had made considerable progress in reducing the inspection effort, with no loss in effectiveness. In particular, the two agencies had made significant progress in the use of inspectors and equipment. Complying with its obligations under the Guadalajara and Quadripartite Agreements and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, ABACC had forwarded 3,200 accounting reports to IAEA, as well as 770 inspection reports to both countries and 30 to IAEA, and 19 declarations to Brazil and Argentina, of which 11 had been related to compliance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco and had been forwarded to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The ABACC secretariat felt that the efforts undertaken by Argentina and Brazil to eliminate the risks of nuclear weapons in the region had made an appreciable contribution to world peace.

36. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) took the Chair.*

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

37. **The President** said that the following nominations had been received: Mr. Reznikov (Belarus) for the post of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I; and Mr. Villagra-Delgado (Argentina) for the post of Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee.

38. *Mr. Reznikov (Belarus) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I; and Mr. Villagra-Delgado (Argentina) was elected Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee.*

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2000/SR.9

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

17 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 9th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 1 May 2000, at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. Kuindwa (Vice-President)	(Kenya)
later:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)

Contents

Election of Vice-Presidents (*continued*)

General debate (*continued*)

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00-41248 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Election of Vice-Presidents (*continued*)

1. **The President** said that the Group of Non-Aligned Countries had proposed the candidacies of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria for three of the four remaining vacancies for Vice-President of the Conference.

2. Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria were elected Vice-Presidents of the Conference.

General debate (*continued*)

3. **Mr. Oskanian** (Armenia), after emphasizing the crucial role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in eliminating both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, commended the decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the second of the strategic arms reductions treaties, START II, and hoped that it would open the way to negotiations on START III. His country had joined 155 States in signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), whose entry into force was a priority element in the implementation of article VI of the NPT. His Government supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and welcomed the zones established in South-East Asia and Africa since 1995.

4. The five-year period under review had been marked by both achievements and setbacks for the global non-proliferation regime. Universality of the Treaty remained a high priority for all States parties. Yet regional security problems stood in the way of universality, and the security concerns of the four States which were not parties must be addressed on the regional level. The non-parties would have a reason to join and parties would be more inclined to comply fully with their obligations if effective security assurances could be achieved to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons as a guarantee of security. Some nuclear-weapon States had announced that they had ceased production of fissile material for use in weapons, and it urged all States capable of producing fissile material for weapons purposes to declare a moratorium on production pending the conclusion of a legally binding fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should make full use of its capability as the sole multilateral forum for such negotiations and find a compromise solution leading to the adoption of a treaty.

5. Just three days after Armenia had declared its independence in 1991, the Armenian parliament had adopted a decision to abide by the NPT. After formally acceding to the Treaty in 1993 as a non-nuclear-weapon State, Armenia had concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It had then reactivated its nuclear energy programme with the assistance of IAEA, which had helped to solve a serious energy crisis. The right of States parties to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy under international safeguards was of critical importance and should be maintained

6. *Mr. Kuindwa (Kenya), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

7. **Ms. Rodrigues** (Mozambique) said that, despite the positive developments in the past five years, there had been setbacks in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including the nuclear tests carried out in South Asia, the failure of some countries to ratify the CTBT and ongoing nuclear modernization programmes in nuclear-weapon States. In order to create a world free of nuclear weapons, comprehensive and practical strategies must be devised to meet the specific situations of individual countries. Such strategies would be based on comprehensive national surveys, effective coordination, information management and advocacy for non-proliferation. Inspections conducted by IAEA were one of the most important ways to prevent the acquisition, development and spread of new nuclear weapons technology. The NPT had provided the international community with a framework for action and grounds for optimism. It had also established an international standard: no longer would States parties to the Treaty be allowed to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons with impunity.

8. Her delegation attached particular importance to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and it was concerned at the delay in the ratification and implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba. It invited all States concerned to take appropriate action for its effective implementation and the resulting denuclearization of Africa. It also called on States with special responsibility in international security to help to remove the obstacles impeding the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones.

9. During the cold war, the developing countries had suffered the effects of the nuclear arms race both directly and indirectly. They had lived under the threat of a nuclear strike, and they had witnessed the devotion of precious resources to the vertical development of nuclear weapons. With the end of the cold war, they had hoped to see an end to that threat. A freeze on the development of new weapons would allow resources to be redirected to development needs. The developing countries could benefit greatly from the availability of nuclear energy, and they would like to see IAEA set up a non-selective programme to circulate relevant information so that countries like her own could benefit from Agency projects. Indeed, as a developing State struggling to eradicate absolute poverty, Mozambique strongly supported the idea of linking disarmament to sustainable development initiatives. Through the effective implementation of the NPT, States could enhance their mutual assurances and, through nuclear disarmament, free huge amounts of resources for development.

10. **Mr. Hasan** (Iraq) said it was clear that, while the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had abided by their commitments, some of the nuclear-weapon States parties had failed to do so. There was still no clear prospect of the elimination of nuclear weapons; universality had not been achieved; Israel, backed by nuclear weapons, continued its arrogant behaviour; no tangible steps had been taken to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons; and no clear progress had been achieved to ensure the exercise by all the parties to the Treaty of their right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Failure to implement the Treaty and the resolutions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference reflected an international atmosphere in which hegemony, increased reliance on nuclear deterrence, military alliances, the unilateral use of force and the constant marginalization of United Nations mechanisms, were used to achieve the political interests of the dominating great Power, as in the case of the sanctions imposed on Iraq and the use of inspection activities in Iraq for United States intelligence purposes.

11. Owing to the non-implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference, the Arab countries faced constant danger and blackmail from Israel, which continued to build up its nuclear capability and to practise a policy of hegemony. Israel's nuclear arsenal included sophisticated weapons built with United States assistance. Indeed, the United States had recently agreed to give Israeli experts access to its nuclear facilities with a view to developing Israel's nuclear technology. Israel, in turn, transferred American nuclear technology to other countries. Yet the Treaty provided the Arab countries with no guarantee against the Israeli threat.

12. Under the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and various United Nations resolutions, the international community was legally bound to require Israel to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. The recent Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, for its part, had expressed great concern over Israel's nuclear capability and had condemned Israel for continuing to develop its nuclear arsenal. The working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States to Main Committee II of the Conference contained recommendations with a view to removing the Israeli threat.

13. The United States continued its own violation of the Treaty by supplying nuclear technology to Israel, deploying nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, refusing to ratify the CTBT and indicating its intention to develop a national missile defence system.

14. Iraq, for its part, fully complied with its obligations under the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. In March 2000, the Agency had reported that Iraq had fully cooperated with the inspection team and that all nuclear materials had been found in agreement with the IAEA inventory. Prior to that, in October 1998, the Agency had stated in its report to the Security Council (S/1998/927) that there were no indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance (para. 17).

15. However, the activities of IAEA and the defunct United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) had been used as a cover for prolonging the embargo imposed on Iraq and achieving certain political aims of the United States, thereby constituting a serious deviation from their mandates from the Security Council. Agents of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had transmitted to Washington all the information which IAEA had

obtained from inspection activities in Iraq, their aim being to conspire against Iraq and its leadership. They had also installed eavesdropping devices to monitor the movements and communications of Iraqi officials. Thus, the inspection and monitoring regime in Iraq had been a tool in the hands of the United States Administration, seriously damaging the credibility of IAEA and the United Nations by continuing the genocidal embargo in the name of the United Nations. Iraq demanded compensation for the damage it had suffered as a result of those acts of aggression; it also demanded that those responsible should be punished, and that the Conference should adopt recommendations that condemned activities undermining the impartiality of the work of IAEA.

16. The United States and the United Kingdom had used depleted uranium in their aggression against Iraq in 1991 and against Yugoslavia in 1999, despite the disastrous effects of such a radiological weapon on human beings and the environment — effects which would continue for centuries unless action was taken to decontaminate Iraq's environment. His delegation invited the Conference to call for the prohibition of the use of such weapons and also invited IAEA to help Iraq reduce the negative effects of that disaster, and affirmed Iraq's right to demand compensation.

17. In December 1998, immediately following the withdrawal of IAEA inspectors from Iraq, upon instructions from the United States Administration, the United States and the United Kingdom had launched a full-scale aggression against Iraq, including destruction of the nuclear-monitoring instruments, thereby dealing a fatal blow to the IAEA monitoring regime. The Conference should condemn that aggression and provide for compensation to Iraq. A previous blow directed at the IAEA safeguards regime had been Israel's aggression in 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear reactor. The Security Council had condemned that aggression and called upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards (resolution 487 (1981), para. 5), but its resolution continued to be mere ink on paper. Iraq hoped that the Conference would explicitly prohibit military attacks against nuclear facilities placed under IAEA supervision. He noted, however, that the background papers submitted by IAEA and the United Nations Secretariat had failed to mention those facts; indeed, the papers submitted by the Secretariat had presented a distorted picture of the Iraqi situation that bespoke a total surrender to the American master.

18. His delegation urged all States parties to intensify their efforts to increase awareness of the threats to humankind posed by nuclear weapons. It welcomed the various international and regional proposals on nuclear disarmament, including the working paper in document NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3. It welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and START II and stressed the legal and moral responsibility of those States possessing nuclear weapons to eliminate them at the earliest date. The nuclear-weapon States which preached democracy and human rights must learn that the first principles of democracy and human rights were the equality of all human beings with regard to their need for security and safety. The goal of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction must be adopted as the standard by which to measure the extent to which States had abided by their commitments.

19. **Mr. Erwa** (Sudan) said that his country supported the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the paper submitted by the Movement to the Conference. As one of the first States to sign and ratify the NPT, the Sudan reaffirmed its full commitment to the Treaty in the interests of promoting international peace and security.

20. The nuclear threat was as grave as ever: nuclear weapons continued to proliferate outside the IAEA safeguards system. As the Secretary-General had noted at the outset of the Conference, there was a lack of political will to activate the international mechanisms for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and those mechanisms had been left to rust. Consequently, the Conference had a historic responsibility to redress the current nuclear imbalance and to pursue efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

21. Some limited progress had been made towards the prevention of proliferation, the latest being the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT. The Sudan hoped that that action would prompt other nuclear-weapon States to take serious steps towards banishing the nuclear threat and reaffirming their commitments under the Treaty.

22. The Sudan shared the international community's concern at the refusal of the nuclear-weapon States to enter into serious negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. He endorsed the call of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Conference on Disarmament for the

setting up of an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations for a phased programme of nuclear disarmament within a specific time-frame, including the conclusion of a multilateral convention on nuclear disarmament, in keeping with the spirit of article VI of the Treaty and the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, in which the Court had reaffirmed the obligation to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

23. Even though all the other States in the Middle East had become party to the Treaty, Israel still refused to do so. Whereas some major Powers had brought pressure to bear on certain disadvantaged States to become parties to certain treaties, they at the same time gave Israel full access to nuclear technology and assistance in developing its nuclear programme, in clear violation of the Treaty. His Government's call for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East was based on the importance of achieving a just and comprehensive peace in that region. Peace would be unattainable unless all such weapons owned by Israel were eliminated. It was the clear responsibility of the Conference to take action, in the light of Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty and to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. That responsibility included efforts to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference, which had called for Israel's accession to the Treaty without delay, as a step towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

24. The nuclear-weapon States were committed under article I of the Treaty to withhold nuclear assistance from Israel as long as it refused to accede to the Treaty and to submit its facilities to IAEA safeguards. The States parties to the Treaty, and particularly the United States, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom were, as sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East, called upon to exert the utmost effort to induce Israel to accede to the Treaty.

25. In conclusion, he stressed the importance of the unwavering commitment of all States parties to all provisions of the Treaty. They must refrain from selectively implementing only certain provisions, and they must be firmly committed to the implementation of the resolutions adopted at the 1995 Conference. It might be the last opportunity for States to eliminate the nuclear option, achieve the universality of the Treaty and avert its collapse.

26. **Mr. Minoves-Triquell** (Andorra) said that Andorra, a country without a Ministry of Defence, an army or missiles, had lived in peace and neutrality for 700 years, yet it had become clear that, in the twenty-first century, neither isolation nor neutrality was a guarantee of peace. Since it had joined the United Nations in 1993, Andorra had been actively involved in the cause of disarmament and had provided whatever assistance it could in that area. Although Andorra had no military structures or nuclear installations, it had wished to join the moral stand against nuclear proliferation, and had signed the NPT and the CTBT in 1996. It welcomed the fact that eight other States had joined the NPT since the 1995 review.

27. It was a common responsibility of humanity to preserve the planet from destruction and, if possible, to turn back the clock to a time when the means of global annihilation had not existed. To that end, existing disarmament agreements must be fully implemented and new ones developed to foster safe and progressive disarmament.

28. *Mr. Baali (Algeria), President, resumed the Chair.*

29. **Mr. Kuindwa** (Kenya) said that his country had excellent credentials in the area of disarmament: it had been one of the first to sign the NPT in 1968 and one of the original 21 members of the Conference on Disarmament, and it was on that basis that his Government had lent its unswerving support to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Thus, the lack of progress in many areas was of great concern to his delegation. The easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which had resulted from the end of the cold war had been expected to facilitate nuclear disarmament, but it had had a contrary effect in some cases. Nuclear-weapon States had reneged on their commitments under the NPT, the United States had failed to ratify the CTBT, nuclear tests had taken place in South Asia, and effective international arrangements on negative security assurances were lacking, showing an absence of political will to fulfil obligations.

30. All those factors were contributing to an erosion of the non-proliferation regime and threatening collective security. The insecurity created by a lack of commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to move towards disarmament had provided others with an excuse to test. Deplorable though the actions by

India and Pakistan might be, a wake-up call had been sounded that must be clearly heard.

31. It was also disappointing that posturing by some at the Conference on Disarmament had rendered it moribund. Discussions must start sooner rather than later on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would help to salvage the non-proliferation regime. The recent decisions taken in the Russian Federation on the CTBT and START II were to be commended and brought the entry into force of the CTBT closer.

32. Among issues of particular importance to Kenya, the failure to achieve universality of the NPT was especially disappointing. It was imperative for States which possessed nuclear weapons capability to be Parties to the Treaty so that they could be subject to IAEA safeguards. Conversely, States which had opted not to join should not benefit from the transfer of technology for peaceful uses. The question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was of great significance to countries like his which continued to grapple with economically crippling energy deficiencies. Therefore, access to nuclear technology by all States parties should be provided on an assured and predictable basis, and technical assistance should be extended without any constraints.

33. The success of the Conference would depend entirely on whether participants believed that the NPT was still relevant in its current form, or whether the changes which had taken place since its extension and the lack of progress on commitments called for a new approach. For instance, the need for security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States was apparent and had the support of most members of the international community, yet still such assurances had not been provided. They would best take the form of an international convention of a legally binding character and would encourage those outside the NPT process to consider joining it.

34. The dumping of radioactive waste in the developing world, particularly in Africa, was once again becoming a problem. He appealed to all States generating such waste to act responsibly in dealing with it, especially as countries which were without the benefits of nuclear technology did not possess the know-how to handle its waste.

35. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that, in addition to taking new decisions, the Conference would ensure that the decisions made earlier were implemented.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

NPT/CONF.2000/SR.10

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

23 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 10th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 1 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. Vohidov (Vice-President)	(Uzbekistan)
later:	Mr. Baali (President)	(Algeria)

Contents

General debate *(continued)*

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00-41254 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Kasiev** (Kyrgyzstan) said that the 2000 Review Conference, which was taking place against a background of mounting challenges to the non-proliferation regime, was an opportunity to revive and strengthen the spirit of cooperation that had prevailed at the 1995 Conference, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had been indefinitely extended. While the Conference must build on the decisions and the resolution adopted in 1995, it must look forward as well as back, identifying practical steps to strengthen the implementation of all aspects of the Treaty and achieve its universality.

2. The events in South Asia in 1998 had underlined the importance of regional efforts in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation as a means of strengthening the global regime. His delegation welcomed in that connection the significant progress made towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, which would enhance both global and regional peace and security. It commended the efforts of the expert group established to prepare the form and elements of an agreement for such a zone. The group had held a series of meetings with the participation of representatives of the five Central Asian States, the five nuclear Powers, the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and was close to completing its work.

3. His delegation supported previous speakers who had emphasized the importance of progress towards implementing the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) and the early commencement of negotiations on a third such treaty, as well as achieving significant reductions in the number of nuclear weapons deployed and expediting the negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. He regretted the impasse reached in the Conference on Disarmament on that issue and called on it to seek alternative ways forward.

4. His Government strongly supported the IAEA safeguards system. It had concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency in March 1998 and would begin negotiations on an Additional Protocol in the near future. The disarmament process required strict procedures for the safe transport, storage and use of sensitive nuclear materials. The 2000 Conference should consider new steps to strengthen nuclear-related export controls, enhance physical protection, prevent the unlawful transfer of nuclear materials and counter the threat of nuclear terrorism.

5. It was important to give due regard to the serious environmental consequences that had resulted, in some exceptional cases, from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. His Government called on all States and international organizations with expertise in the field of cleanup and disposal of radioactive contaminants to provide appropriate assistance for remedial purposes in Kyrgyzstan and other affected countries.

6. At the dawn of the new millennium, the non-proliferation regime was facing new problems and challenges. There was thus no reason for complacency. Indeed, if it was to remain viable, the Treaty would require constant care and attention. His delegation looked forward to working at the Conference to find new approaches with a view to ensuring the integrity and effectiveness of the Treaty in the long term.

7. *Mr. Vohidov (Uzbekistan), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

8. **Mr. Botnaru** (Moldova) said that the end of the cold war had brought with it the promise of the eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction. In order to achieve that goal, there must be continuing progress in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995 had demonstrated the importance that the States parties attached to it in that context. In accordance with the provisions of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference, there must be systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament. His delegation welcomed in that regard the conclusion in 1995 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which represented an effective obstacle to the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and, at the regional level, the voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

9. Since nuclear-weapon-free zones were an important complement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the commitment by the Central Asian States to establish such a zone and the adoption by the

Commission on Disarmament of guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones were also to be welcomed. There had, in addition, been significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, while the Russian State Duma had decided to ratify START II and the CTBT, and France and the United Kingdom had taken unilateral measures to downsize their nuclear arsenals.

10. However, the nuclear tests conducted in 1998 in South Asia represented a serious challenge to the non-proliferation regime, and the lack of progress towards the entry into force of the CTBT and the differences over the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) threatened to impede the process of nuclear disarmament. His delegation urged those countries whose ratification was essential for the entry into force of the CTBT to accede to that instrument without delay. It hoped that a more constructive atmosphere in the Conference on Disarmament would lead to the adoption of verifiable nuclear disarmament measures.

11. His Government strongly supported the activities of IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States with the Safeguards Agreements concluded with the Agency and welcomed the adoption in May 1997 of a Model Protocol Additional to the existent Safeguards Agreements. Although Moldova had no nuclear materials in its territory, his Government intended to conclude an additional protocol with IAEA for the purpose of promoting universal compliance with the Treaty. The Conference must consider other means of strengthening the safeguards system.

12. Conscious of Moldova's location at an important commercial crossroads, his Government was taking all necessary measures to prevent the transit through the country of components, materials and technology intended for use in weapons of mass destruction. It appreciated the assistance provided in that area by the Government of the United States and the European Union. Although the Preparatory Committee for the Conference had failed to produce any substantive recommendations, it had made all the necessary procedural preparations, thus clearing the ground for a result-oriented Conference and providing a good opportunity to produce a realistic programme of action to enhance the Treaty and ensure the full implementation of its provisions by all States parties. His delegation stood ready to contribute to that process.

13. **Mr. Estevez-Lopez** (Guatemala) said that, with the development of nuclear weapons, mankind had been confronted with the previously unimaginable spectre of an armed conflict that could result in its complete annihilation. Recognizing the need to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples the international community had concluded the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That instrument was certainly not perfect. Indeed, it had maintained the inequality between the five States that possessed nuclear weapons prior to 1967 and the other States parties, which were required under the Treaty to renounce the nuclear option forever. The Treaty, however, constituted no more than an intermediate step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

14. His delegation had welcomed the Treaty's indefinite extension and the measures taken at the 1995 Conference to strengthen and refine the review process. It noted with satisfaction the positive developments in the areas of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation since 1995, including the accession of a further nine States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the decision by the Russian State Duma to ratify START II and the CTBT, the reaffirmation by the five nuclear Powers of their commitment to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the progress made towards establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Asia and Mongolia. His delegation urged all States not yet party to that Treaty to accede to it and called on those States whose ratification of the CTBT was necessary for its entry into force to accede to that instrument. Lastly, he hoped that the States of South Asia and the Middle East would continue their efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions.

15. **Mr. Neewoor** (Mauritius) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty's objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were inextricably linked. It was the promise of disarmament that provided the rationale for the permanent renunciation of the nuclear option by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The failure of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty was the most important issue before the Conference. The continued deployment in the world of 36,000 nuclear warheads

showed how little the nuclear Powers had done to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, efforts were being made to achieve the qualitative enhancement of existing nuclear capabilities and there were plans to deploy weapons in outer space. The very credibility of the non-proliferation regime was at stake.

16. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence had resulted in greater proliferation of nuclear weapons and upgrading of nuclear capability by one nation inevitably led to a new nuclear arms race. There was therefore no alternative to total nuclear disarmament, which must be achieved within an established time-frame. The end of the cold war had presented opportunities for serious dialogue among the nuclear Powers. Small steps had been taken by the United States and the Russian Federation in 1997 to reduce their nuclear arsenals, and other nuclear Powers had made unilateral pledges to reduce their nuclear arsenals. He welcomed the recent ratification of START II by the Russian Federation and its decision to ratify the CTBT and hoped that the United States and the Russian Federation, along with other nuclear States, would act boldly to implement START III and agree on a time-frame for total denuclearization. It was regrettable that a time-frame for the total elimination of nuclear weapons had not been included in the CTBT, which was the major reason why Mauritius had not yet become a signatory.

17. The 1995 Conference had envisioned not only the conclusion of the CTBT by 1996, but also a fissile material cut-off treaty, the establishment of new nuclear-free zones and determined efforts by the nuclear Powers to reduce nuclear weapons globally with a view to their eventual elimination. Unfortunately, there had been no movement towards a fissile material cut-off treaty and nuclear disarmament remained stalled. On the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon States had concluded the treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok creating two major nuclear-free zones. Mauritius had been among the first States to ratify the former and called upon States which had not done so to ratify that Treaty as soon as possible. The countries of the Middle East, Israel in particular, should also take the steps necessary for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in that region.

18. He deplored the reluctance of the nuclear Powers to fulfil their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerning the transfer of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful uses to developing countries under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, which was the only tangible benefit that the developing countries expected from the NPT. The transport of nuclear waste across the seas and the risks that that entailed were also a source of concern to developing countries. That situation was further aggravated by the absence of a proper compensation regime, which must be addressed by the Review Conference.

19. A registry should be created under the auspices of IAEA where records could be kept of all nuclear weapons wherever they might be stationed, since they represented a serious danger for adjacent populations. That registry should be accessible under strict conditions to sovereign Governments, which were responsible for the safety and security of their peoples. The fact that there were nuclear-weapon States which had not acceded to the NPT or the CTBT should be recognized. Accordingly, he called for the early convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament which would broaden the scope of the discussion of nuclear issues in a new, global, perspective and also address the issue of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism.

20. **Ms. Raholinirina** (Madagascar) said that the Review Conference was taking place at a time when the international situation was complex and unstable. Hopes for peace and prosperity raised by the end of the cold war had been dashed by the growing level of violence in the world. Since the 1995 Conference, there had been both progress and setbacks in the areas of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 had contributed to regional and international insecurity and undermined the objectives of the NPT. In that regard, she reaffirmed her delegation's commitment to the principles contained in the 1971 Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and welcomed the recent decisions by four States of that region, the Comoros, Djibouti, Oman and the United Arab Emirates to accede to the NPT. She hoped that India and Pakistan would soon add their names to that list in order to promote a culture of peace in the region.

21. She regretted that the NPT was not yet universal and that the nuclear Powers still had some 35,000 nuclear weapons, thousands of which were ready for immediate launching. The total elimination of nuclear weapons must be the international community's ultimate objective in order to remove that threat to mankind. The impasse in negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials and the

differences of opinion concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which could lead to a renewed arms race, were also sources of concern. In addition, recent statements by nuclear Powers reaffirming their strategic doctrines based on nuclear deterrence could compromise the NPT itself.

22. There had, nevertheless, been some positive developments. The nuclear Powers had taken steps to substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals and the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 session had adopted without a vote principles and guidelines for the established of new nuclear-weapon-free zones. The establishment of such zones was a powerful and irreversible trend which would certainly lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Zones free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, should be set up in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia. It was also encouraging that the Russian Parliament had approved START II and the CTBT for ratification, which should prepare the way for negotiations on START III.

23. Since the NPT was the key to preventing a nuclear holocaust, its provisions and the 1995 Principles and Objectives must be fully implemented. The indefinite extension of the Treaty should not be taken to mean that nuclear weapons would also continue to exist indefinitely. There was no justification for the possession of nuclear weapons, the use of which was considered a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity.

24. Nuclear energy could, however, contribute to the well-being of mankind and there should be a wide-ranging exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technical knowledge in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Special attention must be given to the developing countries in accordance with the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Conference. Her delegation supported the convening of a special conference of the States parties on the promotion of cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and stressed the excellent relationship which her Government enjoyed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Review Conference provided an ideal opportunity to renew commitments under the NPT and work towards a new era of peace and harmony. A world free of the spectre of nuclear war was possible if delegations joined in putting the interests of mankind above all other considerations.

25. **Mr. LaFortelle** (France) introduced on behalf of his own delegation as well as those of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America a common statement of their positions on issues relating to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses. He drew attention to paragraph 10 of the statement, which declared in particular that none of their nuclear weapons were targeted at any State. They also reaffirmed their willingness to continue efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in general, in accordance with decision 2 (1995). The text of that statement would be circulated as an official Conference document.

26. **Mr. Roman-Morey** (Secretary-General, Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)) noted that the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean continued to be an example for the international community. Nearly 40 years before, at the height of the cold war, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, a group of Latin American intellectuals had laid out the principles of the first treaty on nuclear disarmament. As a result, in February 1967 the Treaty of Tlatelolco had been opened for signature and had since been ratified by 18 States, thus establishing the first nuclear-arms-free zone, covering a large and densely populated region of the planet.

27. The NPT, although a close contemporary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, had been concluded and entered into force after the Latin American regional instrument. In addition, unlike the latter, which categorically prohibited nuclear weapons and was valid indefinitely, the NPT simply sought to put an end to the proliferation of nuclear arms in the international community and had not been extended indefinitely until a quarter century after its creation. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and other regional disarmament agreements were therefore essential elements in the international regime of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Despite the near universality of the NPT at the international level and the Treaty of Tlatelolco at the regional level, and more than 30 years after their entry into force, the issue of nuclear weapons continued to concern the international community.

28. Since 1995, additional States had associated themselves with the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament. Chile and Brazil had acceded to the NPT in 1995 and 2000 respectively. However, of the four

States still not signatories, India and Pakistan had acquired de facto nuclear status while Israel continued to be an undeclared nuclear State. The fourth State, Cuba, was a special case since it did not have any real nuclear military capability, had signed the nuclear safeguards of IAEA and had signed but not ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its amendments.

29. In the area of nuclear disarmament, article VI of the NPT was very clear, and the Principles and Objectives had in addition committed the nuclear Powers to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. In that context, the CTBT had been concluded and opened for signature yet the major nuclear Powers were delaying its entry into force. He applauded the decision by the Russian Duma to ratify the CTBT and hoped that the United States and the other States whose participation was necessary for its entry into force would follow suit. In Latin America, the Treaty had been ratified by nine States and signed by 14 others.

30. The Conference on Disarmament had made little progress in finalizing the Convention banning the production of fissile material for military uses. He recognized the efforts, albeit slow, of the nuclear Powers to dismantle their arsenals and thereby achieve effective nuclear disarmament and welcomed the declaration made by the representative of France. Nevertheless, as the Secretary-General had stated at the beginning of the Conference, there were still more than 35,000 active nuclear warheads in the world, barely 3,000 fewer than in 1970 at the height of the cold war. Although there were not 25 or 30 nuclear Powers as predicted by President Kennedy when he launched his Atoms for Peace programme, the five nuclear Powers, plus two, plus one more, were keeping the 182 States which had decided never to possess nuclear weapons in a situation of permanent insecurity by virtue of the very existence of such weapons. Nuclear weapons must be completely eliminated since they posed a continued threat to the very existence of the human race.

31. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba had been concluded, and negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia were well under way. Mongolia had also unilaterally declared itself a nuclear-weapon-free country. However, in the Middle East, the only region mentioned specifically in the Resolution annexed to the Principles and Objectives, there had been no real progress.

32. The issue of nuclear-free zones was important for his agency because OPANAL had created the first and most universal nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean had decided to reject nuclear weapons in 1967; at least two States in that region had been capable of developing nuclear weapons but had freely decided to choose the path of peace, security and development offered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That example had been followed by other regions of the world. In that regard, he pointed out that the Treaty of Pelindaba had become possible only when one of the States parties had freely decided to give up not only its nuclear capability but also its nuclear status in the interests of universal security. In addition, 110 States, representing more than 60 per cent of the international community of nations, were now included in nuclear-weapon-free zones, proving that, where a clear and definite political will existed, nuclear disarmament was possible.

33. The peoples of the world and future generations should not have to wait any longer after having lived through more than 40 years of nuclear anxiety. There was no room for complacency since it had been proven that the end of the cold war had in no way put an end to the nuclear threat and the peoples of the world would not forgive delegates if the Conference failed to reach agreement. They must ensure that the nuclear arms race would not resume and that there would be no new incentives for nuclear proliferation. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had succeeded in achieving those objectives and would continue to inspire the world community in the areas of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

34. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

35. **Mr. Naciri** (Observer for the League of Arab States) said that it was a source of concern for the non-nuclear-weapon States that the Treaty had not laid down a timetable for nuclear disarmament, bearing in mind that those States lacked sufficient guarantees in the event of nuclear aggression. Universality of the Treaty had still not been achieved, since four States, including Israel, India and Pakistan, the "undeclared nuclear States", had not acceded to it. Furthermore, the non-proliferation regime had suffered two setbacks, namely, the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan and India in 1998, and the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT, which might discourage the

ratifications and accessions needed for its entry into force.

36. The Arab States, considering a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East to be an irrevocable strategic goal, were concerned that Israel possessed nuclear weapons and categorically refused to accede to the Treaty. Furthermore, it kept its nuclear activities shrouded in mystery, pursuing deterrence based on uncertainty and insistence on the nuclear option to put pressure on Arab States to accept its conditions in the peace process. The Israeli stance disrupted the balance of power in the region, and could even lead to a new arms race, exposing the whole world to incalculable risks. Despite Israeli intransigence, the Arab States had spared no efforts to transform the Middle East into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. The idea behind the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, adopted by the General Assembly over 25 years earlier and re-emphasized at every session since then, enjoyed broad acceptance among Member States.

37. At the 1995 Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had achieved the indefinite extension of the Treaty as part of a package that had included the resolution on the Middle East. However, the failure by the three depositary nuclear States, which had sponsored that resolution, to exert the utmost efforts for its implementation might further harden the position of Israel without providing the non-nuclear-weapon States parties with significant guarantees.

38. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the League of Arab States, meeting in Beirut in March 2000, had adopted a resolution which called on the 2000 Review Conference to evaluate the extent of fulfilment by States parties of their commitments under the Treaty; emphasized that continuation by Israel of its nuclear programme outside the context of the non-proliferation regime threatened security and stability; called on the States parties, and especially the depositary States as sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East, to spare no effort to secure Israel's accession without further delay and placement of its facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime as a step towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone; called on the nuclear-weapon States to pledge, under article I of the Treaty, not to transfer to Israel any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist or encourage it in their production or acquisition; called on the States parties to cease the transfer of any nuclear technology to Israel, so long as it failed to accede and to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime; and supported the call by the Non-Aligned Movement for the establishment of a subsidiary body under Main Committee II of the Conference to consider means of implementing the resolution on the Middle East.

39. The international community was seriously seeking universality and was proceeding with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Well over 100 States had signed treaties establishing such zones, which now covered more than half the land surface of the globe. In that context, and in the face of the challenge posed by Israel's ambiguous nuclear policy, the League of Arab States had established a committee to prepare a draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The League had also established a committee to monitor Israeli nuclear activities and assess the risks which they posed to international peace and security.

40. The position taken by the League consisted in continued efforts to achieve universality of the Treaty and the greatest degree of transparency, including Israel's accession and its submission to the safeguards regime; mobilization of support for the Arab position at the Conference, including support for the "Resolution on the Middle East" and renunciation of the nuclear option; and encouragement of the Arab States to acquire peaceful nuclear technology, with support from the advanced nuclear States, with a view to harnessing such technology for development.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2000/SR.11

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

13 June 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 11th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 2 May 2000 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Abelian (Vice-President) ..... (Armenia)

Later: Mr. Baali (President) ..... (Algeria)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

Election of Vice-Chairmen (*continued*)

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In the absence of Mr. Baali (Algeria), Mr. Abelian (Armenia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Alemán** (Ecuador) said that despite the important advances of the past 55 years, nuclear disarmament had stalled. Those States which had decided not to develop nuclear weapons and had ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) were justly concerned by the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear arms, by the development of more sophisticated weaponry for reasons of national security, by military doctrines that did not exclude the first use of nuclear force, by the slow pace of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and by obstacles to international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

2. Ecuador itself was a party to the NPT and to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and had been active in the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). The Latin American countries had been the first, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to declare a nuclear-weapon-free zone and advocated extending the zone to include the entire southern hemisphere by linking it to similar zones in other regions.

3. The NPT must become universal. It was inconceivable that countries with proven nuclear capabilities should not be covered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, and the fact that four States had not ratified the Treaty was undermining peace and stability in their regions. On the other hand, the recent ratification of the CTBT and the second of the strategic arms reduction treaties, START II, by the Russian Federation was an encouraging development. In view of the huge arsenal still in the possession of the nuclear Powers, the risk of an inadvertent war had not diminished even though increasing political, moral and legal limitations had been placed on the effective use of such weapons. The periodic reviews of the NPT should not simply go over the same ground but should make headway in extending its implementation and the observance of its principles and objectives. All nuclear-weapon States, a number of which continued to deploy nuclear weapons on alert status for supposed security reasons, had to negotiate in good faith to eventually achieve total disarmament under effective international control. Accordingly, his delegation supported the working paper submitted in document NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3 as a significant contribution to further progress.

4. **Mr. Pérez-Otermin** (Uruguay) observed that the instruments of war and destruction had to give way to development projects that would advance human well-being, and a safe method of disposing of the nuclear wastes from power plants had to be found. The Latin American region had taken the leadership in renouncing the possession of nuclear weapons and declaring a zone of peace, and all States parties to the NPT must strive towards the same overriding goal. The entry into force of the CTBT was becoming more urgent as an unequivocal expression of support for the aims of the NPT. The Lima Appeal by the OPANAL member States had shown the way.

5. Looking to the future, the Conference must propose ways of ensuring verification and peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and the nuclear States must think in terms of humanity as a whole by cooperating in the transfer of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear States. The Conference must also give a clear message that would satisfy the concern of coastal States with regard to the regulation of transit shipments of plutonium and radioactive wastes on the high seas, a hazardous activity completely incompatible with article IV of the NPT. The likelihood of an accident was high, and such a disaster would have an incalculable impact on coastal countries. Such catastrophes were completely avoidable if proper action was taken now to suspend all such transport. Many other challenges, such as the proliferation of anti-ballistic missiles, nuclear proliferation, illicit traffic in nuclear materials and the dangers of an arms race in space would also have to be dealt with in the spirit of the NPT.

6. **Ms. Durrant** (Jamaica), speaking on behalf of the 14 States parties which were members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) observed that many approached the Review Conference with a strong sense of foreboding and feelings of frustration at the disappointing lack of progress on the multilateral disarmament agenda. The meeting nevertheless presented an important opportunity to redirect action and adopt an aggressive strategy aimed at strengthening the NPT regime.

7. In the five years since the indefinite extension of the NPT, the number of ratifications had risen to 187. With the accession of Chile and Brazil, the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean had been expanded, and nuclear-weapon-free zones had been created in Africa and South-East Asia with the Treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok. The CARICOM countries welcomed the adoption in 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol, which provided IAEA with a more effective verification mechanism. Since the adoption of the CTBT in 1996, 54 States had ratified it, among them 28 of the 44 whose ratification was essential for the Treaty's entry into force. The Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify START II and to begin discussions with the United States on START III was another positive development. Even so, the anticipated progress had not been realized. The continued arrogation of superior nuclear power by a few had served only to incite others to challenge that superiority, thereby undermining the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament. In that, the nuclear-weapon States must bear the weight of responsibility, for they had failed to pursue negotiations in good faith on the various measures essential for the achievement of the NPT goals and had shown a glaring lack of commitment to the NPT preamble and provisions. The stalemate had served as the dismal background for the nuclear tests undertaken in India and Pakistan in 1998. Universality of the NPT had still not been achieved. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and the Middle East remained a distant objective. All those were issues that demanded urgent attention at the Review Conference.

8. Expressing support for the working paper presented by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex), the CARICOM States also reaffirmed the right of all States parties to develop and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and urged the removal of all obstacles to the transfer of the relevant technology. The CARICOM States remained concerned over the risks to which coastal States were exposed by the practice of shipping nuclear wastes through the Caribbean Sea. The Review Conference was the appropriate forum for addressing the matter squarely. The International Maritime Organization Code of Practice, while binding, did not protect en-route coastal States, and they consequently had no legal recourse to compensation for accidents, which became more likely as shipments of radioactive nuclear wastes increased dramatically. The CARICOM States consequently intended to introduce for consideration in Main Committee III a working paper under article IV, which would call for consultations leading to the establishment of a comprehensive international regime for the protection of the population and marine environment of en-route coastal States from shipments of nuclear material.

9. **Mr. Kittikhoun** (Lao People's Democratic Republic) said that, despite the indefinite extension of the NPT, existing nuclear arsenals continued to pose the greatest danger to the survival of civilization. Nuclear weapons had been modernized, States had found new rationales for their use, and the CTBT had not yet entered into force. All States, but particularly the nuclear-weapon States which bore the greatest legal responsibility, must in good faith pursue negotiations leading to total nuclear disarmament.

10. The performance of the NPT over the past years had not yielded the expected results. The negotiations on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices had yet to begin. His delegation regretted the lack of progress on that issue, and hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would soon conclude the negotiations for a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile materials. It was important to address nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament measures in parallel.

11. Learning from its past experiences about the danger of nuclear weapons, the international community should make every effort, on entering the new twenty-first century, to ensure that mankind could live without the threat of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Conference, at its current session, should lay the groundwork for States parties to the Treaty to agree to negotiate and conclude a legal instrument to provide assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States concerning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In that context, the issue of concluding a legal binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States deserved the utmost attention of the world community and should be strongly pursued.

12. His Government welcomed the increase in the number of States parties to the NPT since its entry into force in 1970. The fact that 187 States were now parties to the Treaty, testified to its global appeal in terms of both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear

disarmament. His Government supported the strong aspirations of the peoples in many parts of the world in their efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in their respective regions, including South-East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the South Pacific. The creation of those zones would help to free the peoples concerned from the nuclear threat. In that context, he welcomed the adoption of the principles and guidelines by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in the previous year on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as well as the adoption by the Mongolian parliament of the legislation on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

13. In view of the significant contribution made by nuclear material, equipment and technology to scientific research, and hence to economic growth, it was a cause of concern that developing countries had only restricted access to them. That practice was inconsistent with the prevailing international atmosphere of cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

14. The present Conference provided an excellent opportunity for all States parties to evaluate and consider adopting new measures to ensure that the provisions of the NPT and the decisions adopted in 1995 were fully implemented. For its part, the Lao People's Democratic Republic would continue to cooperate fully with other States parties towards the achievement of the ultimate goal of the Treaty: the building of a world free from nuclear weapons.

15. **Mr. Lelong** (Haiti) commended commitment to the cause of nuclear disarmament manifested by Japan, a country which, because of its own painful experience, was all too aware of the dreadful consequences of nuclear proliferation. Recalling the positive developments that had taken place in the disarmament process, he said that, as a sign of good faith, France and the United Kingdom had adopted transparency measures: they had taken courageous initiatives relating to arms reductions, had immediately ratified the CTBT and were observing a unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material for military purposes. The United States and the Russian Federation, for their part, had taken bilateral action to advance the disarmament process within the framework of the START treaties. His delegation welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II and trusted that negotiations on START III would begin in the near future. The decision of the Russian parliament to ratify the CTBT following the presidential elections was also an encouraging event.

16. There had been positive progress in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation welcomed the entry into force in March 1997 of the Treaty of Bangkok for South-East Asia and hoped that the African countries would not delay in taking action to ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba, signed in April 1996. As had been true in the case of the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 and the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985, the establishment of the two new zones could only serve to strengthen international peace and security. He looked forward to the outcome of the negotiations to establish a fifth zone in central Asia.

17. He welcomed the decision of the nine countries which had joined the NPT in 1995, thus helping to make it the most universal disarmament instrument in existence, and the fact that the role of the IAEA as a competent and responsible authority for verifying and ensuring the respect of the commitments of the States parties had been strengthened with the adoption in May 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol.

18. At the same time, the agreements between States parties on the question of nuclear disarmament seemed to be merely agreements of principle, as the actions of certain Powers did not always reflect the obligations they had undertaken in accordance with article VI of the NPT. Also, the mistrust or belligerence which had lasted for decades was not about to disappear. It was only by creating attitudes appropriate to the new era and to a culture of cooperation and mutual assistance that the world could finally free itself of the baggage of the cold war.

19. His Government had always taken great care to emphasize the inequality inherent in the international regime. Accession to the NPT was a move towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the area of horizontal and also vertical proliferation. The doctrines of "sufficiency", "nuclear deterrence" and "self-defence" advocated or maintained by the nuclear-weapon States had not increased the confidence of the non-nuclear-weapon States. If it was a question of self-defence, then why deprive others with a similar aim? Moral authority was paramount: preaching should be by example, and preferential treatment should be

avoided. Otherwise, it would seem that the nuclear Powers were more devoted to the cause of hegemony than to the possibility of complete disarmament for the benefit of the whole planet. The Canberra Commission had described the situation as highly discriminatory and thus unstable, a situation which could not be sustained, since the possession of nuclear weapons by any State was a constant stimulus to other States to acquire them.

20. Efforts should be strengthened to ensure the universality of the NPT. The nuclear tests carried out in May 1998 by India and Pakistan were sufficient to show that a state of emergency should be declared. Thirty years after the entry into force of the NPT, and despite the positive impact noted, the global situation, although unipolar, was no less threatening. Clandestine nuclear programmes had been discovered, transparency and non-respect of safeguards agreements were prevalent, and there was the stubbornness of the nuclear Powers. A negotiation mechanism for a treaty to ban fissile material had still not been established. Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were still in disagreement with the IAEA on inspection issues. China had not yet ratified the CTBT, although it had been open for signature since 24 September 1996, in suggesting an amendment to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), the United States was planning to develop a national missile defence system, thus reviving the concerns of the international community, particularly the Russian Federation. As for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its security argument was not convincing. Indeed, it was hardly conceivable that the alliance that already had the most sophisticated conventional weapons should wish to cling to its nuclear weapons and its divisive policy, on the pretext of deterring potential aggressors.

21. Haiti, like many other States in the Caribbean region, was extremely concerned about the risks of accidents that could occur during the maritime transport of radioactive material. Given its experience of the illegal dumping of toxic waste on the Haitian coast, waste that had stayed there for more than ten years, his Government was very sensitive to the potential for ecological disaster and reiterated its support for General Assembly resolution 54/225. Paragraph 5 of that resolution called for an improvement in emergency response capabilities with a view to a timely, effective and coordinated response for the containment of environmental damage in the Caribbean Sea area in the event of an accident or incident relating to maritime transport.

22. His delegation rejected the argument that the security of nations was dependent on any form of nuclear weapon. It deplored the growth of military expenditure and the extravagant allocations for defence budgets. Used for other purposes, such funds would certainly help to reduce the widening gap between rich and poor countries. It was surely high time for politicians to understand that genuine security was based on the socio-economic development of nations and the development of a culture of peace between peoples for them to act accordingly.

23. **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal) said that the NPT stood at a crossroads. Thirty years after the Treaty had entered into force, there was little to be proud of in terms of the realization of the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty. Despite the positive results that had emanated from the operation of the NPT, serious challenges lay ahead to silence its critics, although the disregard of its provisions by some States, both parties and non-parties, should not be viewed as failure of the Treaty.

24. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT had been a milestone event in view of its success in reaching three important decisions and adopting a resolution on the Middle East. It would be recalled that those historic decisions formed a package deal and that a bargain had been struck between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in order to give permanency to the NPT. Whereas the non-nuclear-weapon States had kept their promise to forgo the nuclear option, there was hardly any evidence to indicate that the nuclear-weapon States had fulfilled their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, which required them "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

25. The present situation looked gloomy because of the following factors: the Treaty still lacked credible universality as three of the States remaining outside the non-proliferation regime possessed nuclear capabilities; the South Asian nuclear tests in May 1998 had posed a serious threat to the entire non-proliferation regime; START II was still not

operational pending completion of the ratification procedure; until the required number of instruments of ratification was obtained, the CTBT could not enter into force; some States were reaffirming nuclear doctrines in order to justify the retention of and reliance on nuclear weapons for security purposes; and the leading nuclear-weapon State was intent on pursuing a national missile defence programme which would adversely affect the integrity of the ABM Treaty.

26. The encouraging progress made in the field of nuclear disarmament should be acknowledged, however limited it might be. The recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT, the unilateral decision by some nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear stockpiles, the observance of moratoriums on nuclear tests after the 1996 signing of the CTBT, the growing number of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world and the 1997 Model Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements were indeed positive steps towards achieving long-cherished goals of nuclear disarmament.

27. The Conference was taking place at a critical juncture. There was much at stake not only for States and Governments, but for civil society and responsible individuals as well. The entire world community was closely watching the outcome of the Conference. It was therefore vital for all to demonstrate what could be done to make the world a safer and better place to live in.

28. **Mr. Maquieira** (Chile) said that his country had acceded to the NPT in 1995, immediately after the Review and Extension Conference and prior to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which clearly established the obligation to negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament, the ultimate and fundamental aim of the system established by the Treaty. The extension of the Treaty was legitimate only to the extent that it was accompanied by a serious commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

29. Some progress had been made since 1995, including the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, the conclusion of a strengthened safeguards systems, the real reductions of nuclear stockpiles in some of the five recognized nuclear Powers, and, most recently, the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT.

30. Progress had been less than expected, however, and the many unfinished tasks needed to be dealt with urgently and in a spirit of compromise, given the tendency emerging among some of the international actors. It seemed that the security of some was to be increased at the cost of the security of others. Henry Kissinger had once said that the absolute security of one State would imply the absolute insecurity of all the others. It was imperative to reverse that dangerous trend, and in that context his country fully supported the New Agenda Coalition, which represented a moderate and constructive approach to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

31. Chile was a party to all the regional treaties which contributed to disarmament and international security, including the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Also, his Government had recently finalized the internal process for ratification of the CTBT, another of the hoped-for outcomes of the system created in 1968. It regarded the negotiation of a convention banning the production of fissile material as an urgent task awaiting the international political community as another means of promoting international peace and security. Chile was playing an active role in MERCOSUR, an economic and political entity in the southern cone of the continent which had declared a peace zone and was encouraging confidence-building measures. Lastly, he supported the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the working paper which had been submitted in document NPT/CONF.2000/18.

32. Another cornerstone of the efforts being made to strengthen the review process for the Treaty was the set of principles and objectives decided upon in 1995. The States parties should update those principles and objectives, recognizing the ones which had been met thus far and outlining those which should be met in the next five years. Together with the launching of negotiations on fissile material, universal and binding guarantees should be obtained on the non-use of nuclear weapons. To meet the Treaty's important objective of ensuring equitable access to technologies and materials for developing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the States parties should ensure that the control of exports was transparent and that it was made progressively multilateral in structure and scope. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be duly protected through a strengthened system of safeguards, such as the one developed by IAEA, which Chile strongly supported.

33. Of particular relevance in the light of the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, at a time when all but one of the States of the region had acceded to the Treaty. In the broader context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Chile attached special importance to the regulation of the international maritime transport of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel according to the highest international safety standards. Such transit should be regulated by means of friendly negotiations in which the views of riparian and transit States, in particular, were taken into account.

34. With 187 States parties, the Treaty had the potential to offer the international community the chance to create truly universal conditions for an existence free of the nuclear threat. Chile had deplored the conduct of nuclear tests by India, Pakistan, China and France. It welcomed Brazil's recent accession to the Treaty and urged those countries which had not yet done so to follow suit. The regime established by the Treaty was characterized by a balance between the responsibilities and obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. That fact must be borne in mind in efforts to strengthen the review process for the Treaty, with a view to both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the measures agreed upon to strengthen the review process for the Treaty formed a whole, together with the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely, and were therefore inseparable. The decision on extension had solemnly proclaimed the political will to end nuclear proliferation; the decision to strengthen the review process had strengthened the obligation of all States parties to comply with the Treaty; and the decision on principles and objectives was the point of departure for the gradual but complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

35. **Mr. Mabilangan** (Philippines) said that the lack of progress in the preparatory process for the Review Conference, together with recent developments in the areas of nuclear proliferation and disarmament, painted a bleak picture for those who longed for a world free of nuclear weapons. The Treaty was the outcome of compromises built on compromises and of the uneasy union between the desire of the nuclear-weapon States to maintain their nuclear advantage and the desire of the rest of the world for the fulfilment of the legal commitments enshrined in article VI of the Treaty. The best solution to nuclear proliferation was nuclear disarmament.

36. Failure was not an option, in view of the renewed arms race; the weakening of the anti-ballistic missile regime; the heightened possibility of regional nuclear war; the proliferation of fissile material and the possible use of nuclear weapons by terrorists; the militarization of outer space and the continued improvement of nuclear arsenals and capabilities; and the nuclear-weapon States' immutable adherence to nuclear doctrines. The stakes were even higher in the Asia-Pacific region, where nuclear weapons had first drawn blood and the final nuclear tests of the last millennium had been conducted. All the most volatile flashpoints were in the Asia-Pacific region, and all of them had a decidedly nuclear dimension. Region-wide efforts continued with a view to addressing the causes of conflict and the potential for war, *inter alia* through the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, while the individual States of the region continued to engage other States on regional security matters.

37. He reiterated his support for the conduct, at the earliest possible date, of an international conference aimed at reaching agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which should prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use and should provide for their destruction. He welcomed the Secretary-General's call for a major international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers (A/54/2000, para. 253), as well as the decision to establish a subsidiary body under Main Committee I to consider practical steps for the systematic elimination of nuclear weapons. He supported the statement made and the working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex) introduced by the Indonesian delegation on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

38. Although the lack of progress in relation to the regime established by the Treaty was disheartening, the fact that so many States had condemned that situation, that all States not parties to the ABM Treaty had been called upon to accede to it and that all the nuclear-weapon States had reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament showed that there was hope that those abominable weapons would be eliminated. While he welcomed the statement made the preceding day by

the French delegation on behalf of the nuclear-weapon States, he recalled the need to translate words into deeds. He also appreciated the statement made by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and sympathized with the concerns which had prompted the United States to propose a national missile defence system. However, those perceived threats must be weighed against the already delicate balance in the non-proliferation and disarmament equations. The United States should consider carefully all the ramifications of its intended course of action and should not be bound by artificial constraints.

39. In view of the need for creative approaches to nuclear disarmament, he welcomed the initiative taken by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden in issuing a communiqué entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda" (A/54/423), which provided fresh perspectives that broadened the choices available to the international community. Nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed not only to nuclear non-proliferation, but also to nuclear disarmament. The inaugural meeting of the Executive Committee for the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, held in October 1999, had been an important step towards the implementation of that Treaty. Negotiations were under way to address the concerns of the nuclear-weapon States with a view to encouraging them to sign the Protocol to that Treaty. He welcomed Mongolia's initiative to establish itself as a single-nation nuclear-weapon-free zone (NPT/CONF.2000/16), and recalled that the Philippines had done likewise in 1987.

40. Recently, owing to competing partisan interests and the propensity for misunderstanding, established legal norms had been disregarded or misapplied. The Review Conference provided States parties with a crucial opportunity to strengthen the rule of law by ensuring that all of them fulfilled their legal commitments. To that end, the States parties must consider all proposals that sought to ensure the sanctity of those commitments, such as the proposal to establish an institutional framework for the Treaty, which had been put forward in various forums. That idea deserved further study, as did the larger question of the evolving institutional relationships among the various international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. It must be borne in mind that, while the Treaty did not legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons, its extension had not been unconditional but had been part of a package of agreements. Insinuations to the contrary were not helpful.

41. While all the States parties were responsible for the successful outcome of the Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had a special role to play in that regard. They had not fully complied with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty or with the principles and objectives agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In that connection, he welcomed the recent developments in the Russian Federation with respect to START II and the CTBT. The slow pace of nuclear disarmament owing to political realities should not stop the international community from doing more. He trusted that the Conference would help ensure that article VI of the Treaty, which currently seemed to be suspended in a time warp, would be put into practice so that the common aspiration for a world free of nuclear weapons would be one step closer to fulfilment.

42. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) took the Chair.*

43. **Mr. Jokonya** (Zimbabwe) said that, while the Treaty was the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the new world order did not seem to provide a framework for strengthening the review process as a means of promoting the full implementation of the Treaty, as reflected by paragraphs 249 and 250 of the Secretary-General's report to the Millennium Assembly (A/54/2000). Zimbabwe, as a party to the Treaty, was committed to the goal of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Treaty required both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to make progress towards general and complete disarmament. Some nuclear-weapon States recognized that fact, as shown, *inter alia*, by the statement made by the Chinese delegation in the First Committee on 14 October 1998 (A/C.1/53/PV.5), which had called upon the nuclear-weapon States to intensify their efforts to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

44. As long as there was an exclusive club whose members were reluctant to give up their nuclear option, threshold nuclear Powers would always be tempted to try to gain entry into that club. He hoped that the current adverse trend in disarmament would not trigger a new nuclear arms race. Recent negative developments had included the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT, despite the assurances given by the United States delegation in the First

Committee on 14 October 1998 (A/C.1/53/PV.5); the maintenance of nuclear weapons as an essential part of NATO and United States security policy; the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament; the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan; and the challenges to the ABM Treaty.

45. On the positive side, Zimbabwe welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II and the CTBT, which demonstrated the Russian Federation's full commitment to its obligations under article VI of the NPT. Due consideration should be given to the Russian Federation's concerns about the challenges to the ABM Treaty, since further reductions in strategic offensive weapons could only be considered in the context of the preservation of that Treaty. As the representative of the Russian Federation had stated on 25 April 2000, if one component of the system of arms control agreements was weakened, the entire system would be destabilized. That observation echoed the Secretary-General's assertion, in paragraph 251 of document A/54/2000, that unless plans to deploy missile defences were devised with the agreement of all concerned parties, the progress achieved thus far in reducing the number of nuclear weapons might be jeopardized.

46. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the Review Conference, his delegation had stated that its experience in the Conference on Disarmament had demonstrated the futility of engaging in negotiations without political will. The Secretary-General had made a similar observation in his address to the Review Conference, and had proposed a results-based Treaty review process that focused on specific benchmarks, such as the entry into force of the CTBT. The latter not only set up political and technical obstacles for any country designing nuclear weapons for the first time but also represented a cornerstone of efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. It was disheartening to note that some nuclear-weapon States had chosen not to ratify that instrument, even though it would enable them to meet their obligations under article VI of the NPT.

47. Another benchmark would be an irreversible reduction in stocks of nuclear weapons. The New Agenda Coalition had put forward proposals to that end. The current Review Conference should not only consolidate existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, but also negotiate the establishment of new ones. A third benchmark would be the provision of binding security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States should formally recognize the legally binding nature of assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and to regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. The determination of whether a State was in good standing under those treaties and protected by such assurances should be made by IAEA or another authoritative international body. Lastly, he urged the nuclear-weapon States to continue negotiations aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons, pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and in line with the advisory opinion rendered in 1996 by the International Court of Justice.

48. **The President** said that the representative of Bangladesh would be unable to deliver his statement as scheduled, his arrival in New York having been unexpectedly delayed. Copies of the text were being distributed and, if there was no objection, a summary of the statement would be included in the official records of the meeting.

49. *It was so decided.*

Summary of the statement by Mr. Shafi Sami (Bangladesh)

50. The vision of the twentieth century that would emerge from the Millennium Summit must be shaped by the realization that nuclear weapons were the most dangerous threat to civilization; nuclear non-proliferation was a goal that could be achieved through political will. The delegation of Bangladesh endorsed the five benchmarks established by the Secretary-General in his opening statement and was prepared to cooperate with him in the achievement of those goals.

51. Non-compliance with the safeguards provisions of the Treaty and differences of opinion regarding the full implementation of that instrument and the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons posed a clear and present danger. His Government was particularly concerned at the "nuclearization" of South Asia and urged India and Pakistan to become parties to the Treaty and to sign the CTBT. He congratulated the States parties that had concluded agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa since 1995 and supported the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and other parts of the world. His delegation also welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT and to reduce its nuclear stockpiles.

52. Full disarmament was mandated in the Constitution of Bangladesh. His Government had been the first in South Asia to accede to the CTBT and was contributing a seismic station to the International Monitoring System of the CTBT verification regime. It had concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA and was considering the conclusion of an additional protocol thereto. He called upon States parties that had not yet signed safeguards agreements to do so.

53. His delegation welcomed the forward-looking decisions of the 1995 Review Conference, which had laid the foundation for a strengthened review process, and thought that it might be time to consider establishing an elected executive council to deal with questions of non-compliance and implementation.

54. As President of the Conference on Disarmament at its 2000 session, it was Bangladesh's goal to play a moderating and facilitating role in enhancing appreciation of differences, bridging gaps and creating consensus. It would continue to contribute to the process of consensus-building with a view to the adoption of a declaration of principles and objectives to be achieved by 2005. The current impasse in the Conference, which was the only consensual universal multilateral body on disarmament issues, was undesirable. The 2000 Review Conference should seek common ground on the basis of the 1995 programme of action and in particular with regard to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and working groups on nuclear disarmament, security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

55. He was encouraged by the fact that the Treaty was only four accessions short of universality and noted that Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) had urged India and Pakistan, and all other States that had not yet done so, to become parties to the NPT and the CTBT without delay and without conditions.

56. His Government attached great importance to implementation of article IV of the NPT. It was disappointing that, 32 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, the developing States had yet to gain access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He called for a closer study of the matter and hoped that the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which had been established for that purpose, would be transparent in its operations and that States parties would adhere to the provisions of the Treaty in both letter and spirit.

57. Lastly, he urged States parties to overcome their disagreements and to remember that nuclear proliferation had serious implications not only for international peace and security, but also for development, which constituted the agenda of over two thirds of the world's inhabitants.

Election of Vice-Chairmen (*continued*)

58. **The President** recalled that the Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee II and Main Committee III had not yet been elected. He had been informed that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had endorsed the candidacies of Mr. Yaw Odei Osei (Ghana) and Mr. Hamid Baeidi Nejad (Islamic Republic of Iran) for the posts of Vice-Chairmen of Main Committees II and III, respectively.

59. *Mr. Osei (Ghana) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II and Mr. Baeidi Nejad (Islamic Republic of Iran) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III.*

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

22 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 12th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 5 May 2000, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Baali ..... (Algeria)

Contents

Preliminary reports by the Chairmen of the three Main Committees and the Credentials Committee

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Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Preliminary reports by the Chairmen of the three Main Committees and the Credentials Committee

1. **The President** informed the meeting that the General Committee, having considered at its 4th meeting, the question of overlap of issues between the Committees, particularly with regard to the work of Main Committees I and II, proposed that Main Committees I and II should address the issue of compliance/non-compliance in relation to the articles of the Treaty allocated to them, with Main Committee I addressing issues relating to articles I and II, and Main Committee II addressing issues relating to article III.

2. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt that proposal.

3. *It was so decided.*

4. **Mr. Reyes Rodriguez** (Colombia), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee I, said that the Committee had held four meetings, during which it had heard the views of various delegations, including 16 general statements. Following consultations, he had submitted a Chairman's paper to the Committee the previous day and was awaiting reactions and proposals. The subsidiary body of Main Committee I had held two meetings and proposals had been made on the working paper submitted by the Chairman of that body. In his view, the Committee's debate and discussions had begun to focus on substantive issues.

5. **Mr. Kobieracki** (Poland), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee II, said that the Committee had held three plenary meetings during which 15 working papers and 6 conference room papers had been submitted. The Committee had completed its general debate and was now addressing various individual issues, including safeguards, export controls, physical protection and illicit trafficking, and the question of nuclear-weapon States and other States with unsafeguarded nuclear activities. The Committee would take up the final item, nuclear-weapon-free zones, at its next meeting. Given the wealth of material provided so far, the Committee was in a good position to proceed to the drafting stage. In that regard, he would submit to all delegations an initial draft report of Main Committee II in the course of the current day during informal open-ended consultations. He hoped that delegations would be in a position to discuss that draft report as early as the plenary meeting of the coming Monday.

6. Referring to subsidiary body 2, he said that, in accordance with its mandate, it had held two out of four meetings. The Middle East, South Asia and other regional issues had been discussed. A number of working papers and proposals of direct relevance to the work of that body had been discussed. The Chairman of the subsidiary body intended to submit a draft report in the coming week.

7. **Mr. Reimaa** (Finland), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee III, said that the Committee had held a total of three meetings devoted to a general exchange of views, during which 28 delegations had made general statements. The major issue addressed had been the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including maritime transport of such energy, radioactive materials, nuclear safety and technical cooperation and the liability and role of nuclear energy in sustainable development. At the Committee's second meeting, a presentation had been made by a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Agency's technology transfer activities and its technical cooperation programme. Two closed meetings had also been allocated for the presentation of proposals by delegations. In that regard, a total of 10 working papers and four conference room papers had been introduced. To date, 17 Main Committee III documents had been issued. He would submit an informal initial draft report to the first meeting of the open-ended drafting group of Main Committee III. He believed that the Committee would be able to complete its work within the allotted time-frame.

8. **Mr. Widodo** (Indonesia), speaking as Chairman of the Credentials Committee, introduced the interim report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/CC/L.1). The Committee had met twice to examine the credentials of representatives participating in the Conference. On the basis of the information received from the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Committee had decided to accept the credentials of 139 States parties participating in the Conference, including those of Liechtenstein, on the understanding that those delegations which had not presented their credentials in the form required by rule 2 of the rules of procedure, would do so as soon as possible. The Committee would keep the receipt of credentials under review and meet again, as necessary.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.